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To look back into the future, where the confidence of the whole world 展望未来 世界的信心何在?


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全球展望:信心与信任
● 展望未来  世界的信心何在?  / 季莫菲·博尔达切夫(Timofei Bordachev)

● 展望未来  信任从何而来?   / 扬·奥伯格(Jan Oberg)

By Timofei Bordachev, Prof. Dr., National Research University – Higher School of Economics, “Valdai” Club Foundation
文|季莫菲·博尔达切夫(Timofei Bordachev)   俄罗斯国家研究型大学高等经济学院教授、“瓦尔代”俱乐部教授
翻译|胡昊        译审|王晓波

导读

当前国际政治局势的独特性和戏剧性在于,事实上,我们不能期待一个国家或者一些足够强大的国家能够在未来扮演领袖角色。这意味着,我们很难想象谁能够迫使各国都遵守其外交政策中的行为规则,以及如何做到这一点

过去五百年的国际秩序及展望

大国行为的某些特征成为了整个国际政治发展中的系统性因素

欧亚地区国际机构的未来

 

 

Currently, China and Russia are looking to the future based on the unique relations formed between them over the past decades. However, this future will not become easy and simple for the whole world in the coming years: many dangerous challenges lie in wait for us. But even now, China and Russia should understand that their cooperation is not only a response to current problems, but also the creation of a more stable international order based on equality and the national interests of each state.

The uniqueness and drama of the current situation in international politics lies in the fact that we cannot count on the ability of one state, or a group of sufficiently powerful countries, to play the role of leaders in the future. This means that it will be quite difficult for us to imagine who will be able to force states to comply with the rules of conduct in their foreign policy and how it will be possible.

Over the past 500 years, the rules of international relations have been created within the close community of Western countries, exactly, in Europe. In the 20th century, the United States joined to that community, which provided the necessary strength to enforce the rules. First of all, this happened thanks to the balance of power between the main European states, which Russia joined in 1762. After the European international order, born in the middle of the seventeenth century, was attacked by revolutionary France, compliance with the rules became the business of a small group of great empires. Led by Russia and Great Britain, they defeated Napoleon and created in 1815 an order based on the general agreement that revolution is unacceptable in international affairs.

At the end of the 19th century, politics became global, but the European powers, including Russia, were still able to control the rest by brute force and their immense military-industrial superiority. The dramatic events of 1914-1945 brought the United States to the forefront of world politics, where the USA became the leader of the community of Western countries at the world level. International institutions were created, starting with the UN, the main goal of which was to preserve the monopolistic position of the West. However, this required the appearance of formal signs of justice in the form of international law, as well as participation in the supreme UN body, the Security Council (UN SC), Russia and China, which are inherently hostile to the interests of the United States and Europe.

The institutional form of Western domination by force has become its final embodiment, and the main question now is whether it is possible to preserve the form after the inevitable disappearance of its content and main function or not. Therefore, the collapse of the positions of power of the United States and Europe in international politics implies not only a change of direction, but also a revision of existing institutions and rules at the global level. In other words, the whole formal international order that emerged after the Second world war, but which has existed in recent centuries, will cease to exist.

It was based on a special system of rights and privileges for a select group of great powers and the illusion of justice, which was created by international institutions headed by the UN. It was this system that served as the main principle of legitimization of the existing world order, although in practice it was often replaced by the ability of the West to exert decisive influence on world affairs. Thus, the collapse of international political institutions is most likely due to the disappearance of their power base, the existence of which has been indisputable for several centuries. As a result, we are currently witnessing the destruction of the formal and real foundations of the international order. It is likely that this process can no longer be stopped.

The coming period will be the time to determine the new power base of the order, and it is difficult to say which forces and to what extent will be part of it.

It is important that the great powers of today, such as the United States, Russia, China and India-are not close and, moreover, are not united in terms of values and understanding of the fundamental principles of the internal structure. So far, the biggest problem is the behavior of the United States and some Western European countries, which, due to their internal values, pursue aggressive policies towards the outside world. These states have entered a very worrying path of qualitative change in the fundamental elements that shape the social, gender and, consequently, political structure of society. For most other civilizations, this path constitutes a challenge and will provoke rejection.

We also do not know how much the internal development of the West is necessary to carry out the expansion, as was the case in previous periods. If, like revolutionary France, the Bolshevik regime or Nazi Germany, the internal orders that are being formed in the West demand not only recognition, but also expansion, the future will become very worrying. We are already seeing that the conflict between the expansion of the values of the West and the foundations of internal legitimacy in several countries is becoming the basis for the aggravation of political relations.

However, it would be a mistake to hope that the other large and medium-sized powers opposed to the West are fully united in understanding the foundations of justice at the internal level. Even if Russia, India, China or Brazil now demonstrate a common understanding of the fundamental principles of the “good” world order, this does not mean that they share a common vision of a better internal arrangement. This is especially true for the states of the Islamic world and other large developing countries. Their conservative values are often in conflict with those of the West, but this does not mean that they can achieve unity among themselves.

In other words, for the first time, a new international order will not be able to have a reliable link with the internal order of the great powers, and it is in fact a qualitative change compared to all the historical epochs that we know. This phenomenon is very important, because we have no experience of how relations between powers develop under such circumstances. Brute force becomes the only relatively tangible foundation of order, but this may not be enough to ensure the sustainability of the conditions imposed in relations, even in the short term.

Another unique feature of the current revolutionary situation is that the revision of the international order is not carried out by one or more powers – it is now the business of the world majority. Countries that have about 85% of the Earth’s population are no longer ready to live in conditions created without their direct participation. Their revolutionary actions are often expressed without direct intention and depending on the power capabilities of a particular power.

What, from the point of view of Russia or Iran, in relations with the United States is a manifestation of a lack of determination, for Kazakhstan or another young sovereign country can be a great feat-because their entire socio-economic system was created considering the possibilities offered by the liberal world order. The young sovereign states of Africa or the former Soviet space are much less capable of behaving consistently than the prosperous monarchies of the Persian Gulf. China, although it is now the second most powerful economic power, also understands its weaknesses. But all this does not change the most important thing – even if the destruction of the existing order takes the form of soft sabotage rather than decisive military action, this not only reflects the general discontent with Western authoritarianism, but already creates a new order, the main signs of which are still vague.

In the coming years, most countries of the world will strive to take full advantage of the weakening strength of international politics for their own selfish interests. So far, these actions constitute a constructive conflict, because they objectively undermine a system based on fantastic injustice. However, over time, the United States, let alone Europe, will be weakened and focused on themselves, and Russia or China will never become strong enough to take their place. And in the next 10 to 15 years, the international community will have to face the challenge of replacing the monopoly of power of the West with new universal instruments of coercion, the nature and content of which are not yet known to us.

The position adopted by most countries of the world on the conflict between Russia and the West shows that humanity is now much more united and adaptive, even in the face of such serious challenges than we thought just recently. This refutes the current idea that the United States plays a central role in world affairs and that it continues to ensure that any problem it faces is equally important to the rest of the world and capable of dividing it. At the same time, Russia itself should not think that being on the right side of history, it automatically provides support from most states-for this we still must fight. It would be unwise to think that the refusal of most countries of the world, which represent 85% of the world’s population, to join the West’s economic war against Russia indicates that they support everything that Russia is doing.

After almost a year since the beginning of the Special Military Operation, we can say that the dynamics of international attitudes towards the military-political conflict around Ukraine and its participants indicate that most countries of the international community choose a strategy of distancing themselves from the conflict and avoiding expressing a position, taking advantage of the conflict between Russia and the West. The exception is China, whose policy increasingly reflects its pro-Russian orientation and, as China’s contradictions with the United States escalate, China demonstrates the real depth of mutual trust between Moscow and Beijing. These relations have been built over many years and they are derived from the development of the two countries over the past 20 years and a common vision of approaches to the main systemic problems — mutual support is not directly related to the crisis in Europe.

It is too early to judge the future world order, when the West will be forced to admit its historic defeat in the struggle to preserve world hegemony. World domination will be determined as the great powers, by their often-conflicting actions, will indicate the limits of their power capabilities and the limits of what is permissible. Realizing the irrationality of a major total war and the scale of long-standing problems, the process of defining roles in the world order is likely to take much longer than previous episodes of radical changes in the international order based on sovereign states. Today we are witnessing only one of the first stages of a long global political restructuring. After all, we can talk about the end of a period that lasted several hundred years.

But even at this very initial stage, we can see certain signs of the behavior of powers that have objective reasons and therefore become systemic factors in the development of the entire international policy.

Therefore, it is vitally important that the division of the world into rival camps should not be one of the signs of a new world order, but the adaptation of States to the changing conditions arising from the conflict between the great Powers.

This will probably be a sign that in the future we will not risk encountering the phenomenon of restoring the bipolar system that characterized the international order during the Cold War of 1945-1990. And this becomes an additional argument in favor of the fact that the rules and norms of behavior of that time can serve as a source of knowledge only for our foreign policy in the modern era, and with a significant share of assumptions.

The flagship of such adaptation to rapidly changing conditions in our time is, of course, India, one of the largest powers in terms of population, which has very serious ambitions regarding its own role in the world. Until now, this country has not reached the level of economic, military and human development that allows us to talk about it as a great power.

However, at the same time, India is the real leader of this majority, which absolutely does not intend to split into rival camps or become a dependent resource base for one of the great rival powers, such as America, Russia or China. India regularly maintains business relations with Moscow and in recent months has become one of Russia’s largest trading partners. The fact that New Delhi’s position is not anti-Russian is constantly emphasized by Indian officials. Restraint in the areas of cooperation with Russia is connected only with a well-founded fear that Indian companies will suffer from retaliatory measures from the United States.

India is followed by most developing countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America. We see that six months after the crisis between Russia and the West escalated into a state of military-political conflict, the number of countries ready to even verbally support the United States in its fight against Moscow has more than doubled. A few days ago, observers noted an attempt to enlist the support of UN countries for a new statement condemning Russia’s actions in Ukraine. If during the voting at the UN General Assembly in March this year, more than 140 countries supported a resolution similar in content, now only 58 have signed their signatures, 30 of which are official members of the NATO Military Alliance led by the United States, and several others are associated with Washington on

Thus, more than two-thirds of the entire international community will increasingly refuse to declare their position on European affairs. Of course, this is partly the result of the work of Russian and Chinese diplomacy, which constantly emphasizes that American policy is the real cause of the conflict in Europe.

But, above all, this dynamic shows that developing countries understand that they have the opportunity not to make this choice.

For them, in the current conditions, the strategy of getting out of the conflict becomes more rational and justified. As events in Europe continue and acquire the features of a permanent conflict between Russia and the West, the degree of tension of which will vary, most countries of the world will be able to adapt better to life in such conditions.

As for the United States itself, the decline in its ability to attract them has led to the adoption of a strategy of intimidation and pressure on independent members of the international community. However, this strategy can no longer be crowned with success — even if Washington has a colossal repressive machine, turning all its international activities into control over the application of “sanctions” would make such a policy completely ineffective. Of course, we cannot rule out such a scenario. As a result, more and more countries will cooperate on an equal footing with Russia and the West, and the pace of this cooperation will depend on the ability to achieve something from these two adversaries.

The conflict in Europe will become more localized and of direct interest to its main players. The rest of the world will somehow not participate. For Russia, the foregoing signifies the importance of remaining open and offering developing countries what they need – energy or other goods, education, science. Russia does not seek and has no reason to be drawn into armed struggle for its interests and values – this is what most countries in the world want to avoid. If the trend we are witnessing continues and becomes increasingly decisive for international politics, we will be able to remain calm, as the division of the world into warring camps will be a condition for preventing the outbreak of world war.

One of the key issues will be the future of the international institutions that have arisen in Eurasia in recent decades – the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, as well as closer alliances around Russia – The Eurasian Economic Union and the Collective Security Treaty Organization. In all three organizations, participating countries will have to rethink the role of these institutions in their own struggle for survival and adapt to the new realities of world politics. So far, they all look like local systems that maintain minimal stability in the face of the rapid collapse of the international order.

Therefore participating countries need to think about how their work will continue after the events in eastern Europe have reached a certain fixed point. First of all, it’s related to what. The use and usefulness of these tools depend on their adaptation to the new conditions that are emerging. Nevertheless, the future importance of these cooperation institutions in Eurasia cannot be determined in accordance with a single plan, because without the creation of a total isolation from the outside world, the international situation in the coming years will not facilitate serious planning.

If we can talk about the potential of institutional cooperation in the new context, the SCO may be able to continue to occupy an important position among regional organizations. In addition, in addition to the objectives of diplomatic cooperation, it must meet new three-tiered conditions. The first is to adapt existing projects and practices to new circumstances. This applies to interaction with measures of large-scale economic pressure exerted by the West on one of the SCO founding members, Russia. At the practical level, the consequences of those measures would harm the economy, social systems and stability of all SCO countries, including China, the most powerful of the member countries. However, the SCO States can intensify their practical cooperation for the common good.

Secondly, whether we wish it or not, the SCO countries, under any circumstances, will have to resolve issues at a joint level, the existence of which is objective. These are “common problems” that must be addressed in a broad regional context. These issues relate to food and biosafety and a secure information environment. Existing problems exist regardless of the current military-political situation between Russia and the West or were caused by the actions of the United States and its allies in areas where they have managed to create major advantages in recent decades.

Finally,  circumstances may develop in such a way that the SCO countries will build a joint future and contribute to the development of the Eurasian macroregion. In the conditions of global turbulence, it is hardly possible to determine the priority directions of the international order in the XXI century. One can say for sure that the well-established ideas about the criteria that international organizations must meet are inevitably being revised. It is difficult to say by what means and on what scale the SCO will act in order to become an important tool for solving long-term development problems for the participating countries of the organization. It is possible that this group of issues will be settled on the basis of the practice of cooperation already established in the first and second areas of interest to us.

 


2023.1 27

目前,中国和俄罗斯正在展望它们之间几十年来建立起来的独特关系的未来。面对世界这种未来关系在接下来的数年里并不简单容易:我们将面临许多危险的挑战。不过迄今为止,中国与俄罗斯都应已经认识到,它们的合作不仅是针对当下问题的反应,也是为了建立在基于相互平等和国家利益之上的更稳定的国际秩序。

当前国际政治局势的独特性和戏剧性在于,事实上,我们不能期待一个国家或者一些足够强大的国家能够在未来扮演领袖角色。这意味着,我们很难想象谁能够迫使各国都遵守其外交政策中的行为规则,以及如何做到这一点。

 

过去五百年的国际秩序及展望 

过去500年里,国际关系的规则是由西方国家共同体,确切地说,是由欧洲国家制定的。进入20世纪后,美国加入了那个圈子,对保证规则的实施提供了必要的力量。起初,这些规则主要考虑欧洲大国间的权力平衡,俄罗斯在1762年参与其中。诞生于17世纪中叶的欧洲国际秩序后来受到法国大革命的冲击,遵守这些规则就成为一小部分大帝国的事情了。在俄罗斯和英国的领导下,拿破仑被击败了,1815年一个基于国际事务中革命是不可接受的普遍共识的秩序建立起来了。

19世纪末,政治变得具有全球性,但是包括俄罗斯在内的欧洲强国依然能够通过暴力以及其庞大的军事工业提供的超强实力控制世界的其他地方。1914-1945年发生的戏剧性事件使美国走上世界政治的前台,美国在世界层面成为西方国家集团的领袖。与此同时,以联合国为发端的国际机构也建立了,其主要目标是防止西方的垄断地位。然而,这就要求正义需以国际法的形式正式出现,俄罗斯和中国都加入了联合国的最高机构——安理会,但它们天然就与美国和欧洲的利益相对立。

西方最终实施的仍是其依靠武力统治的制度形式,现在的主要问题是,在其统治地位的内容和主要职能不可避免地消失之后,它是否有可能把这种形式保留下来。美国和欧洲在国际政治中权力地位的坍塌不仅意味着方向的改变,也意味着全球层面的现有制度和规则的修订。换句话说,第二次世界大战后出现的、但近几个世纪以来一直存在的整个正式的国际秩序将不复存在。

这一秩序是由以联合国为首的国际机构建立的,但它的基础是一些精选大国的特殊权利和特权体系以及对正义的幻觉。这个体系成为了现行世界秩序合法性的主要原则,尽管实际上,它经常被西方对世界事务施加的决定性影响所取代。因此,国际政治制度的坍塌很可能是由于其权力基础的消失,尽管几个世纪以来,其存在一直是无可争议的。结果我们见证国际秩序的表征和真正基础的毁灭。这个过程大概不再会停下来。结果就是,我们现在看到国际秩序正式且真正的基础正在遭到破坏,而且这一过程很可能无法停止。

未来一段时间将是确定该秩序新的权力基础的时刻,很难说哪些力量以及在多大程度上能够成为该秩序的组成部分。

重要的是,美国、俄罗斯、中国和印度等当今大国的关系并不紧密,而且它们在价值观和对结构内在基本原则的理解方面也不团结。到目前为止,最大的问题是美国和一些西欧国家的行为,这些国家源于其自身的价值观,对外部世界奉行侵略性政策。这些国家已经走上了一条非常令人担忧的道路,其影响社会、性别乃至社会政治结构的基本要素发生了质的变化。对大多数其他文明而言,这条道路构成了挑战,并且会遭到它们的拒绝。

我们也不知道,西方的国内发展在多大程度上使其对外扩张成为必然,就像过去那样。如果与大革命时期的法国、布尔什维克政权或纳粹德国一样,西方正在形成的内部秩序不仅要求获得承认,而且需要扩张,那么未来将变得非常令人担忧。我们已经看到,西方价值观中的扩张与世界几个国家内在合法性基础之间的冲突正在成为政治关系恶化的缘由。

然而,如果希望反对西方的其他大国和中等强国完全团结一致,在国内层面上理解公正的建立,恐怕也是个错误。即使俄罗斯、印度、中国或者巴西现在表现出对“良好”世界秩序的基本原则有着共同理解,但这并不意味着,它们对更好的国内安排持有共同看法。对伊斯兰世界国家和其他大型发展中国家尤其如此。它们的保守价值观经常与西方的价值观发生冲突,但是这不意味着它们可以实现彼此之间的团结。

换句话讲,新的国际秩序将首次无法与大国的内部秩序建立可靠的联结,事实上,与我们所知的所有历史时期相比,它将是一个质的变化。这一现象非常重要,因为我们对在这种情况下权力之间的关系如何发展并无经验。暴力成为唯一可及的秩序基础,但是即使是短期内,它可能也不足以充分保障关系中所强加条件的可持续性。

目前革命性局势的另一个独特的特征是,国际秩序的修订不是由一个或多个大国来完成——现在这是世界上大多数国家的共同事情。占地球人口约85%的国家不再准备在没有它们直接参与的环境下生活。它们的变革行动往往会在没有直接意图的情况下表达出来,这取决于某一特定国家的权力能力。

从俄罗斯或伊朗的角度看,与美国建立关系是缺乏决心的表现,可是对哈萨克斯坦或另一个年轻的主权国家来说,这却可能是一个巨大的成就,因为它们的整个社会经济体系是在考虑到自由世界秩序所提供的可能性而建立的。与波斯湾富庶的君主国相比,年轻的非洲主权国家或前苏联国家的行为能力要差得多。中国尽管是世界的第二大经济强国,但它也了解自己的弱点。但这一切并没有改变最重要的一点——即使现有秩序的毁灭采取的是软破坏而不是决定性的军事行动,它不仅反映了对西方威权主义的普遍不满,而且已经创造了一个新秩序,尽管其主要形象仍很模糊。

在未来几年里,世界上大多数国家将竭力利用国际政治力量的不断走弱,谋求自己国家的利益。迄今为止,这些行动构成了一场建设性的冲突,因为它们客观上削弱了一个基于极端不公正的制度。可是,随着时间的推移,美国,更不用说欧洲,会被削弱并开始聚焦其内部事务,但俄罗斯和中国永远不会强大到足以取代它们的地步。在接下来的10到15年,国际社会将不得不面对用新的广泛适用的胁迫工具来取代西方权力垄断的挑战,这些工具的性质和内容我们现在还不得而知。

在俄罗斯与西方的冲突中,大多数国家所采取的立场表明,人类现在更加团结和适应形势,甚至在面对我们刚才所提出的那些严重挑战时。这就驳斥了时下的观点,即认为美国在世界事务中扮演着核心角色,能够继续保证其所面临的任何问题对世界其他国家也同等重要,而且它有能力对问题做出决定。同时,俄罗斯自身不应该认为站在历史正确的一边,并为那些我们必须争取的大多数国家主动提供支持。认为占世界人口85%的大多数国家拒绝加入西方针对俄罗斯的经济战就表明它们支持俄罗斯所做的一切,这种想法也是不明智的。

特别军事行动开始近一年来,我们可以说,国际社会围绕着乌克兰及其参与者的军事政治冲突的态度变化表明,国际社会中的大多数国家选择了一种远离冲突,避免表达立场的战略,同时又在利用俄罗斯和西方之间的冲突。中国是个例外,其政策越来越反映出亲俄罗斯的倾向。随着中国与美国矛盾的升级,中国表现出莫斯科与北京之间真正的深度互信。这些关系是多年来建立的,源于两国过去20年的发展,以及解决主要制度性问题的共同愿景——两国间的相互支持与欧洲危机没有直接关系。

现在判断未来世界的秩序还为时过早,但那时西方必须被迫承认其在维护世界霸权斗争中的历史性失败。大国的世界统治地位将被其经常自相矛盾的行为所削弱,同时也暴露出其权力能力的局限性和行动的受限性。意识到大规模全面战争的不合理性和长期存在的问题的规模,世界秩序中角色的确定过程可能需要比之前解决以主权国家为基础的国际秩序的剧变事件花费更长的时间。今天,我们只是目睹了漫长的全球政治重组的第一阶段的一部分,而我们讨论的却是持续了数百年的一个时代的终结。

 

大国行为的某些特征成为了整个国际政治发展中的系统性因素 

但即使在这个非常初始的阶段,我们也可以看到大国行为的某些特征,这些行为具有客观原因,因此成为了整个国际政治发展中的系统性因素。

极其重要的是,将世界划分为敌对阵营不应是新的世界秩序的标志之一,取而代之应是各国适应由于大国之间冲突所导致的不断变化的形势。

这或许是一个迹象,表明在未来,我们不会遭遇重新回到1945-1990年冷战期间国际秩序出现的两极体系的风险。它同时也可以成为支持一个事实的又一理由,即当年的规则和行为规范只能作为我们现代外交政策的知识来源,而且其中还有很大成分的假设。

当今适应这种急剧变化形势的典范国家非印度莫属,它是世界上人口最多的国家之一,对自己在世界上将发挥的作用雄心勃勃。虽然到目前为止,它还没有在经济、军事和人文方面发展到可让我们称其为强国的程度。但与此同时,印度是大多数国家的真正代表,它们绝不打算加入敌对阵营,也不想成为诸如美国、俄罗斯或中国等竞争大国所依靠的资源基地。印度一直与莫斯科保持着商业关系,最近几个月它已成为俄罗斯最大的贸易伙伴之一。印度官方始终强调新德里不反俄的立场,但它与俄罗斯的合作领域是有所控制的,这只是因为印度公司担心遭受美国报复措施的影响,这种担忧是有充分根据的。

印度正被亚洲、非洲和拉丁美洲的大多数发展中国家所效仿。我们看到,在俄罗斯与西方之间的危机升级为军事政治冲突的6个月后,准备口头支持美国对抗莫斯科的国家数量增加了一倍多。几天前,观察人士注意到了企图争取联合国成员国的支持,从而发表新声明谴责俄罗斯在乌克兰的行动的图谋。2022年3月,联合国大会投票期间,140多个国家支持了一项类似内容的决议,可是现在,只有58个国家在声明上签字,其中30个是美国领导的北约军事联盟的正式成员,其他国家也都与华盛顿有密切联系。

由此可以看出,整个国际社会中超过三分之二的国家开始拒绝表明它们对欧洲事务的立场。当然,这部分源自俄罗斯和中国外交工作的结果,因为它们一直强调,美国的政策是欧洲冲突的真正原因。

然而,最重要的是,这种变化表明,发展中国家认识到,它们有机会不做出这种选择。

对这些国家来说,在目前状况下,置身于冲突之外的战略变得更加合理和公正。随着欧洲事件的持续,俄罗斯和西方之间的永久性冲突会成为现实的一部分,尽管紧张程度会时松时紧,世界上大多数国家将能够更好地适应这种形势下的生活。

对美国而言,由于它对其他国家吸引能力的下降,导致其对国际社会中的独立成员采取了恐吓和施压的战略。但是,这种战略不会再取得成功——即使华盛顿掌握庞大的施压机器,并在国际上采用各种措施,监督“制裁”的实施,这种政策也只会完全失效。我们无法排除这种情况。其结果就是,越来越多的国家将与俄罗斯和西方在平等的基础上进行合作,而合作的速度则取决于能从这两个对手那里获取某种成果的能力。

 

欧亚地区国际机构的未来

欧洲的冲突将变得更加区域化,并与其主要参与者的利益直接相关,而世界其他国家基本不会参与。对俄罗斯来说,上述情况表明了保持开放和向发展中国家提供它们所需要的物质——能源或其他商品、教育和科学的重要性。俄罗斯不会寻求也没有理由为其利益和价值观卷入武装斗争——这也是世界上大多数国家所竭力避免的。如果我们所看到的趋势继续下去,并且对国际政治越来越具有决定性,我们就能够保持平静,因为世界分裂成交战阵营将是防止世界大战爆发的一个条件。

一个关键的问题是,近几十年在欧亚地区出现的国际机构——上海合作组织,以及围绕俄罗斯的更紧密的联盟—欧亚经济联盟和集体安全条约组织会有怎样的未来。在这三个组织中,成员国将不得不重新思考这些机构在其自身生存斗争中所起的作用,同时还要适应世界政治的新现实。到目前为止,它们看起来都像是在国际秩序迅速坍塌的情况下保持最小稳定的地方体系。

因此,参与国需要考虑在欧洲东部的事件达到某个难以改变的局面后,他们的工作将如何继续。首先要考虑的是它与什么有关。这些机构的运用及有效性取决于它们是否能适应层出不穷的新情况。尽管如此,这些合作机构未来在欧亚大陆的重要性不能依据某个单一的计划来确定,因为如果无法完全与外部世界隔绝的话,严肃认真的规划并不适用于未来几年的国际形势。

如果在新的背景下探讨机构合作的潜力,上海合作组织或许能够继续在区域组织中占据重要地位。另外,除了外交合作的目标外,它还必须面对三个层面的新情况。第一个是使现有项目和做法能够适应新环境。这就包括针对西方对上合组织创始成员国俄罗斯采取的大规模经济施压的措施如何进行反制。因为西方所实施措施的后果损害了上合组织所有国家的经济、社会制度和稳定,包括最强大的成员国中国。因此,上合组织国家可以为了共同利益强化务实合作。

第二,无论我们是否愿意,在任何环境下,上合组织国家都必须共同解决问题,因为这是它存在的目的。这些是必须在广泛的区域范围内解决的“共同问题”,它们涉及食品和生物安全以及安全的信息环境。无论俄罗斯与西方之间当前的军事政治形势如何发展,或是美国及其盟友近几十年在该区域的某些领域为获取最大利益所采取行动,现有的问题都是始终存在的。

最后,形势或许会向这样的方向发展,即上合组织成员国将携手创造一个共同的未来,并为欧亚大区域的发展作出贡献。在全球充满动荡的情况下,很难确定二十一世纪国际秩序的优先方向。可以明确的是,关于国际组织必须满足的标准的既有想法正在不可避免地被修改。但很难说上合组织应当以怎样的方式以及在多大范围内采取行动,从而成为解决本组织成员国长期发展问题的重要工具。可能的是,这些问题会通过我们在第一和第二层面已经确立的合作惯例的基础上得到解决。